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Step Towards the Reestablishment of Proximate Cause
The contrast of individual-group offers a related perspective on
the character of modern social vision. The question posed is
how the court imagines the litigants. Does it view the defendant
and the accident victim as individuated and unique social actors?
Or do courts understand them primarily as participants in, or
even representatives of, groups of social actors that are them-
selves in some sense the litigants? To the extent that the second
interpretation is accurate, the nature of accident law changes.
The court visualizes interaction between groups, and tort norms
regulate group conflict.'
Ramada Inns maintained a swimming pool without statutorily re-
quired "no diving" signs. After warning his brothers to "be careful,"
Greg Murray, an experienced diver, dove into the shallow end of the
pool. Unfortunately, he struck his head on the bottom, suffered instant
paralysis, and died five months later. His wife and son later filed a
wrongful death action in federal district court, charging Ramada Inns
with negligence. At trial, the district court denied the defendant's request
for instructions regarding assumption of the risk on the ground that
Louisiana had replaced that defense with comparative negligence. When
the case reached the Fifth Circuit on appeal, that court certified the
assumption of the risk question to the Louisiana Supreme Court.2
In Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,' the supreme court responded by
announcing that assumption of the risk no longer has a place in Louisiana
tort law.4 In the course of its opinion, the court exhaustively discussed
the relationship between assumption of the risk and Louisiana's com-
parative fault system.5 The court concluded that "the survival of as-
sumption of risk as a total bar to recovery would be inconsistent with
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
1. H. Steiner, Moral Argument and Social Vision in the Courts: A Study of Tort
Accident Law 115 (1987).
2. The question addressed to the court is as follows: "Does assumption of risk serve
as a total bar to recovery by a plaintiff in a negligence case, or does it only result in a
reduction of recovery under the Louisiana comparative negligence statute?" Murray v.
Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (La. 1988).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1132.
5. Eleven of the thirteen pages pages in the opinion are devoted to discussing the
validity of assumption of the risk in light of Louisiana Civil Code article 2323.
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article 2323's mandate that contributory negligence should no longer
operate as a bar to recovery. ' 6 Despite its detailed analysis of the
assumption of the risk issue, the court confined its discussion of the
duty/risk questions posed by the case to two paragraphs of the opinion.
In addressing the scope of the duty owed by the defendant, the court
summarily stated that Ramada Inns owed a duty to the decedent, as it
owed a duty to all potential users of the pool. 7 This approach to
determining the duty owed by a defendant, an approach that focuses
on the defendant's obligations toward general classes of persons, rep-
resents a radical shift from the approach that the court had theretofore
followed.8 Previously, the court had always required, as a prerequisite
to the imposition of any liability, a determination that the defendant
owed a duty to the particular plaintiff under the facts of the particular
case.
The purpose of this comment is to consider the implications of the
supreme court's handling of the duty/risk issues in Murray for the future
of duty/risk analysis in Louisiana. The conceptual nature of the subject
6. Murray, 521 So. 2d at 1133.
7. "[T]he defendants owed a duty to all potential users of the pool to operate that
facility in a reasonably safe fashion." Id. at 1136.
8. See Johnson, Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 1980-1981-Comparative Neg-
ligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 La. L. Rev. 319 (1980).
In its 1979 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature embraced the doctrine of com-
parative negligence with the enactment of Louisiana Acts No. 431. Effective August 1,
1980, Act 431 amends the Louisiana Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure articles
relative to liability for offenses and quasi-offenses to implement the pure form of com-
parative negligence. See Introduction, Comparative Negligence in Louisiana, 40 La. L.
Rev. 289 (1980).
Civil Code article 2323 was amended by Act 431 to provide as follows, "When con-
tributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effect shall be as follows:
If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and
partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim for damages shall
not thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in
proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering
the injury, death, or loss."
Professor Alston Johnson explains the dispute of the effect of the new fault appor-
tionment system on the duty/risk analysis as follows:
[T]he introductory clause to the basic comparative negligence provision reads:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effect
shall be as follows. . . . Nowhere does the Act answer the question of when
contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages .... In each in-
stance, the duty/risk analysis is the proper vehicle by which to determine the
issue of applicability of contributory or comparative negligence. This inquiry
must be complete, in fact, before the tenets of Act 431 can be used. If defendant
is not liable because plaintiff's conduct has created a situation such that defendant
could not possibly be expected to protect him against such risks, then Act 431
is inapplicable.
Johnson, supra, at 339.
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matter makes it difficult to draw clear lines between the topics in this
comment. Although some overlap between the topics is unavoidable, the
comment is arranged into five sections. The initial section of this com-
ment explores the concepts of duty/risk and proximate cause. The section
following this compares the Murray decision to earlier positions on duty/
risk. The next section discusses the two competing theoretical views on
the relationship between victim fault and duty/risk. The section following
that one examines the Murray court's views of the integrity of those
two concepts. The final section considers Murray as part of a trend in
Louisiana tort law.
DUTY/RISK AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
Louisiana's approach to the limitation of liability in negligence cases
is the duty/risk analysis.9 Defining this approach, one prominent scholar
has stated,
Under the duty-risk method of analysis the determination of the
scope of the legal system's protection is entirely a court func-
tion-the jury plays no part in this aspect of the case. The issue
for the court is whether the risk to which the plaintiff has been
subjected is within the scope of the defendant's duty. If the
answer is in the affirmative, the court is then obligated as part
of its duty function to set the standard with which the defendant
must have complied to avoid liability. The jury has the burden
of determining if the standard was breached.' 0
The duty/risk approach forces the court to make what is, in essence,
a policy determination in light of the unique facts of the case. The
factors that the court must consider in making this determination include
ease of association, administrative convenience, economic factors, risk
spreading, deterrence, predictability, and moral considerations." The
primary moral consideration is victim fault.
9. See Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137
So. 2d 298 (1962). Note that E. Wayne Thode argues that Justice Cardozo's decision in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), can be looked upon as
a pioneer case in the employment of the duty/risk analysis. Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-
Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge &
Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1, 22.
10. Thode, supra note 9, at 26.
11. See, e.g., Comment, Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 16 La. L. Rev. 391 (1956).
In Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (La. 1988), the supreme
court stated the policy considerations as follows: "[T]his court has identified the policy
sources informing the conception of the duty in a tort case to be those moral, social,
and economic considerations that a conscientious, objective policy maker would advert
to in formulating a rule to govern the case." The duty/risk analysis is structured to
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As is true of many legal doctrines, duty/risk analysis is not sus-
ceptible of concise description.12 One helpful means of defining the duty/
risk doctrine is to compare it with the doctrine that it in some sense
replaced, namely, proximate cause. Proximate cause has been defined
as follows:
The term "proximate cause" means a cause which in a direct,
unbroken sequence produces the damage complained of and
without which the damage would not have occurred. Negligence
is the proximate cause of the damage when the damage is the
natural or probable result of the negligence. Such negligence
need not be the only cause, but it must be one of them and
such as might have been reasonably foreseen as leading to dam-
age of the general nature claimed in this case. 3
At common law, the proximate cause doctrine performed the same
function as does duty/risk analysis, namely, the limitation of negligence
liability; only those harms that were the "natural consequence," 4 "direct
afford to the law a greater degree of predictability. This predictability is achieved by
meeting certain "goals" that our courts set as guidelines. Justice Dennis called these
guidelines the "basic goals of accident law." According to Dennis:
Accident law generally should pursue four primary goals: (1) reduction of the
total costs of accidents by deterrence of activity causing accidents; (2) reduction
of societal costs of accident by spreading the loss among large numbers; (3)
reducing the cost of administering the accident system; and (4) doing all of
these by methods consistent with our sense of justice. It should be noted that
these goals are not fully consistent with each other. There cannot be more than
a certain amount of reduction in one category without foregoing some of the
reduction in the other. One aim must be to find the best combination of cost
reduction in all categories while considering what must be given up in order to
achieve that reduction. In other words, the overall goal should be the maximum
reduction of the sum of the accident costs and the cost avoiding accidents that
can be accomplished in a just way.
Turner v. Nopsi, 476 So. 2d 800, 807 (La. 1985).
12. As an illustration, consider the number of different definitions of the "reasonable
man."
13. Stoneburner v. Greyhound Corp., 232 Ore. 567, 575, 375 P.2d 812, 816 (1962)
(Goodwin, J., concurring) (quoting Instruction No. 15.01, Oregon Jury Instructions for
Civil Cases, Oregon State Bar (1962)).
14. See Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 610 (1st Cir. 1955), in which the court
stated, "[T]he effort of the courts has been, in the development of the doctrine of
proximate causation, to confine liability of a negligent actor to those harmful consequences
which result from the operation of the risk, or of a risk, the foreseeability of which
rendered the defendant's conduct negligent."
result,"' 5 or "foreseeable result"' 16 of the defendant's acts were com-
pensable. As these terms suggest, the proximate cause doctrine invited
the court to draw a somewhat arbitrary line in the chain of physical
causation in order to limit the defendant's liability. The inquiry was
primarily "metaphysical" in nature; it did not require the court to
engage in policy analysis.
Beginning in the early part of this century, legal scholars began to
express skepticism about the ability of courts to draw the line between
proximate and nonproximate causes on a principled basis and, further,
to question whether the vague terminology of proximate cause has any
determinate content. Some charged that by using these vague phrases,
the courts were masking the policy decisions that they used to reach
their decision and thereby the necessity to articulate their reasons for
finding liability. The late Professor Wex Malone characterized these
phrases as "little more than gaudy ribbons with which the package of
liability may be decorated once its contents have already been fixed by
the courts through resort to some other mystique."1 7 Commentators have
offered several reasons for the development of proximate cause. These
include: 1) the difficulty that courts have articulating the considerations
that influence their decisions; 2) the courts' reluctance to announce the
crucial underlying considerations; and 3) the acceptance of legal ter-
minology to explain liability.' a
One important consequence of the proximate cause doctrine was
that it shifted the responsibility for limiting liability to the jury. At
common law, the jury was charged with the duty of determining what
harms were the "foreseeable" or "direct" result of the defendant's acts.
Thus, the "gaudy ribbons" of proximate cause allow the court to avoid
their obligation to address questions of law. As one writer states, "courts
simply converted a question of law into a question of policy and shifted
the responsibility of decision onto the shoulders of the jury. They
accomplished this result by developing the doctrine of proximate cause." 9
15. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968), in which
the court stated, "(W]e nevertheless conclude that recovery was properly denied on the
facts of this case because the injuries to [the shippers] were too 'remote' or 'indirect' a
consequence of defendants' negligence."
16. See Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 315, 434 N.Y.S.2d
166, 169, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (1981), in which the court stated, "[L]iability turns upon
whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created
by the defendant's negligence."
17. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus American Beverage Co.,
30 La. L. Rev. 363, 364 (1970).
18. Comment, supra note 11, at 392.
19. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty/Risk Analysis, 44 La. L. Rev.
1227, 1228 (1984).
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Since the Louisiana Supreme Court first adopted the duty/risk anal-
ysis in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co.,20 this
approach to limiting negligence liability has gradually replaced proximate
cause and its vague phrases. 21 Under this approach, the limitation of
liability is a legal matter and, for that reason, the court, rather than
the jury, is primarily responsible for the decision. Unlike proximate
cause doctrine, duty/risk analysis forces the courts to confront squarely
the particular policy questions that the case presents. 22 Stated briefly,
the question that the court must address is this: Does the defendant
owe a legal duty to the plaintiff, and if so, does the duty extend to
the particular risk encountered by this particular plaintiff?23 In sum-
marizing how courts should answer this question, Justice Dennis made
the following remarks in Entrevia v. Hood,24
[T]he judge is called upon to decide questions of social utility
that require him to consider the particular case in terms of
moral, social and economic considerations, in the same way that
the legislator finds the standards or patterns of utility and morals
in the life of the community. 25
Through the consistent and proper application of duty/risk analysis, the
courts can render negligence law more predictable than it was when
proximate cause ruled the day. As Professors Prosser and Wade have
noted, "Generally speaking, each ... proximate cause decision turns
on its own facts and has little value as precedent. A judicial declaration
of duty, in contrast, may amount to a statement of law and thus create
precedent, more or less influential according to its factual proximity to
the case at hand." '2 6 Yet another virtue of the duty/risk approach is
that it forces courts to expose their policy judgments to public scrutiny,
thereby making it easier for attorneys and scholars to discover errors
in those judgments and to press the courts for change. 27
20. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962).
21. See Harris v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984); Pence v. Ketchum,
326 So. 2d 831 (La. 1976); Callais v. Allstate Ins. Co., 334 So. 2d 692 (La. 1975); Jones
v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974); Laird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 263 La. 199, 267
So. 2d 714 (La. 1972); Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972).
22. McNamara, supra note 19, at 1230.
23. Id. at 1232.
24. 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
25. Id. at 1149-50. See also B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 105
(1921); Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543 (1962).
26. W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts 416 (7th ed.
1982) (quoting Judge Friedman).
27. In his concurring opinion in Turner v. NOPSI, 476 So. 2d 800, 808 (La. 1985),
Justice Dennis explained this advantage:
Under such an approach, even if we were in error, the basis for our decision
1008 [Vol. 49
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DUTY/RISK UNDER MURRAY
In answering the scope of the duty question in Murray, that is,
whether the defendant's duty extended to the decedent, the court stated
that "[tihe defendants owed a duty to all potential users of the pool
to operate that facility in a reasonably safe fashion." '28 The court's term
"user" is broad enough to include those who had knowledge of the
danger as well as those who did not. In determining that the defendant
owed a duty to this broad class of persons, the court did not consider
the particular qualities of the victim or the unique risk to which he was
exposed. In order to appreciate fully the significance of the Murray
court's approach to the scope of duty determination, one must first
understand the approach that the courts had previously followed. The
pre-Murray approach to scope of duty was summarized by Professor
Wex Malone,29 the champion of the duty/risk approach,30 in these terms:
All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are the product
of a legislature or are a part of the fabric of the court-made
law of negligence, exist for purposes. They are designed to
protect some person under some circumstance against some risks.
Seldom does a rule protect every victim against every risk that
may befall him, merely because it is shown that the violation
of the rule played a part in producing the injury. The task of
defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects
is one that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it
arises. How appropriate is the rule to the facts of this contro-
versy? This is a question that the court cannot escape.
31
The following cases exemplify the approach described by Professor Ma-
lone.
I. The defendant negligently stopped his car in violation of a statute
prohibiting stopping on a traveled portion of the highway. The plaintiff
is open to public examination and mistake can be easily detected and corrected
by lawyers in future cases. If we fail to assess our decisions in terms of its
effects and the goals of our law, or if we shield such reasoning from public
and professional scrutiny, the adjustments of any mistake will be made tortious
and problematical.
28. Murray, 521 So. 2d at 1136.
29. Wex S. Malone (1906-1987): Louisiana State University Law School, assistant
professor 1939-1945; associate professor 1945-1948; Professor 1948-1966; Boyd Professor
1966-1987.
30. Professor Alston Johnson states of Malone, "We acknowledge the unparalleled
accomplishment of replacing the concept of proximate cause in Louisiana as a risk-
exclusion or risk-inclusion device with the more candid device of the duty/risk analysis,
perhaps his greatest single achievement." Johnson, Reminiscing About the Great Rumi-
nator, 44 La. L. Rev. 1167 (1984).
31. Malone, Ruminations on Cause in Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 73 (1956).
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carelessly collided with the defendant. The Louisiana Supreme Court in
Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co.32 held that the duty owed by the
defendant was not intended to protect against the risk of this plaintiff's
careless driving under the specific circumstances of this case.33 Using
the duty/risk analysis, the court looked to the various aspects of the
relationship between this plaintiff and this defendant, and concluded
that the defendant did not owe a duty to protect against the risk of
the accident.14
II. The defendant maintained a borrow pit in violation of a city
ordinance. While the victim, a seventeen year old youth, was swimming
across the pit, he developed a cramp and drowned. This was the factual
situation in Jackson v. Beechwood, Inc." In Jackson, the court cited
Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co. 36 and found
that the defendant had been negligent in maintaining the pit, and that
this negligence was the cause-in-fact of the unfortunate accident.37 But,
upon further inquiry, the court also found that the risk and harm to
this particular victim fell outside the scope of protection owed by this
defendant. In so ruling, the court stated that
[t]he ordinance was intended to guard against concealed or hid-
den hazards which so frequently exist in excavations of this
nature. Likewise, it protects against the hazards of children of
tender years who may fall or venture into the pit. However,
the ordinance does not make a landowner an insurer, nor does
it protect against the hazard that a trespasser capable of looking
after his own safety and an excellent swimmer will intentionally
use the artificial lake and drown therein. 8
Once again the court addressed the specific circumstances of the accident
before making the legal determination of the scope of duty. The court
emphasized the fact that the victim was an excellent swimmer and was
almost seventeen years old at the time of the accident. These factors
alone were sufficient to place the victim's conduct outside the scope of
the defendant's duty, even though the defendant had not posted "keep
32. 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (La. 1972).
33. Id., at 215-16, 267 So. 2d at 720.
34. Id. See Rowe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 La. 659, 219 So. 2d 486 (La. 1969);
see also Note, Duty-Risk in the Lower Courts: Flexibility or Rigidity? 35 La. L. Rev.
871 (1975). In Rowe, the plaintiff parked her car with the left wheel intruding marginally
onto the highway. Plaintiff's car was struck by defendant's truck approaching from the
rear. The court concluded that plaintiff was negligent in not moving her car completely
off the highway and denied recovery.
35. 180 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
36. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
37. Jackson, 180 So. 2d at 733.
38. Id.
1010 [Vol. 49
NOTES
out" signs and had had knowledge that the pit was being used as a
swimming pool.3 9
The court's reasoning in Jackson and Laird "illustrates that the
duty/risk formulation is not narrow and rigid in application but ...
may be used to deny as well as sustain liability." 4 Clearly, in light of
the reasoning in Jackson, the case would undoubtedly have been decided
differently had the plaintiff been a seven year old novice swimmer. In
factual situations similar to Murray a court using the pre-Murray analysis
could have found that the scope of the defendant's duty did not en-
compass the risk of a party who dove into unknown waters. Indeed,
courts have performed this very process numerous times in our juris-
diction.
4
1
III. The defendant, a home repair contractor, after completing his
work, left a ladder upright against the side of the plaintiff's house.
Later, a third party moved the ladder and laid it in the yard. The
plaintiff tripped over the ladder and sustained damages. The supreme
court addressed this fact pattern in Hill v. Lundin and Associates, Inc.42
In holding that the defendant was under no duty to protect the plaintiff
from the risk that gave rise to her injuries, 4 the court stated:
[1If the defendant's conduct of which the plaintiff complains is
a cause in fact of the harm, we are then required in a deter-
mination of negligence to ascertain whether the defendant breached
a legal duty imposed to protect against the particular risk in-
volved.
44
Hill is important because it demonstrates that scope of duty is a question
of law and therefore that the judiciary must make the determination.4 1
39. Id.
40. See Note, supra note 34, at 874.
41. See Van Pelt v. Morgan City Power Boat Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ granted, 493 So. 2d 627 (1986) (dismissed on motion of appellant); Lacroix
v. State, 477 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 478 So. 2d 1237 (1985);
Jolivette v. City of Lafayette, 408 So. 2d 309, 313 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ denied,
413 So. 2d 495, 459 U.S. 867, 103 S. Ct. 147 (1982) "The primary duty of care to
ascertain whether or not it is safe to dive falls upon the diver."); Caillouette v. Cherokee
Beach & Campgrounds, Inc., 386 So. 2d 666, 667 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 387
So. 2d 597 (1980) (Defendant was not "required by law to warn persons of the obvious
dangers attendant to diving into an unknown body of water.").
42. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (La. 1972). It should be noted that Hill is easily
distinguishable from Murray, because of the intervention of a third party. However, the
court's duty/risk analysis makes Hill relevant.
43. Id., at 548, 256 So. 2d at 622.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. The language of the court, especially the phrase, "we are required", unequivocally
suggests that scope of duty is a" mandatory determination to be made by the bench. In
addition, notice that the duty/risk analysis is once again addressed in terms of the
"particular risk."
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The above cases demonstrate how courts ascertain the scope of duty
prior to Murray.46 Under the approach to duty/risk analysis used in
each of these cases, the court must examine the duty of the particular
defendant, the risk to which the particular plaintiff was exposed, and
the circumstances of the particular accident. For example, in Laird,47
the court considered the plaintiff's careless driving in defining the scope
of the duty owed to the plaintiff. Similarly, in Jackson, the court took
the decedent's voluntary behavior into account in making this deter-
mination.4 s
This approach to the scope of duty determination stands in stark
contrast to that adopted by the supreme court in Murray. Indeed, Murray
represents an effort on the part of the court to escape its responsibility
for making this determination, a responsibility that Professor Malone
described as "defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy
aspects." '49 In Murray, the court did not even mention, much less ex-
amine, the general policies of accident law in determining whether to
impose liability. Nor did the court conduct a "particularized inquiry,"
that is, it did not consider the relationship between the defendant and
the victim or the unique risk to which the victim had been exposed. In
fact, the court never acknowledged why or how it reached the conclusion
that the defendant owed a duty to the victim.
The shift in scope of duty analysis represented by Murray is sig-
nificant for several reasons. First, the new approach strips scope of duty
determinations of precedential value. This is so because under Murray
a court apparently need not articulate for the record the reasons and
policy considerations that underlie its finding of a duty. Second, and
more importantly, the Murray decision suggests that the supreme court
has come full circle on the theory of limiting negligence liability. Orig-
inally, under the doctrine of proximate cause, trial courts avoided re-
solving the legal question of scope of duty by converting the inquiry
into a question of "proximate causation" and letting the jury wrestle
with the problem. As one writer has put it, under proximate cause trial
courts did not "recognize that they have a function to perform by way
of defining the limits of the rule involved . . ." and placed the "burden
on the jury under the guise of determining proximate cause." 50 The
proximate cause doctrine further allowed appellate courts to "mask"
their decisions regarding the proper scope of the duty, decisions based
46. These cases are not presented because of their results, but rather to show how
the courts openly supported their decisions by factors particular to the parties in the
action.
47. 263 La. at 215-16, 267 So. 2d at 720.
48. 180 So. 2d at 733.
49. Malone, supra note 31, at 73.
50. L. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 76 (1927).
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upon policy considerations, behind the vague and countless expressions
of "foreseeability" and "natural consequence." In Dixie,51 the supreme
court adopted the duty/risk analysis in order to force trial courts to
reassume responsibility for determining the limits on negligence liability
and 'to force both trial and appellate courts to articulate the policy
considlerations that determine the result in each particular case. Ac-
cordingly, one writer has stated of duty/risk that,
instead of masking the court's intention behind a charade of
fact tortuously constructed from the evidence to fit into one of
the holes in the doctrine of proximate cause .... the meth-
odology utilized by the court offered the opportunity for an
honest and courageous statement of exactly why and what the
court is doing and what it intended.5 2
Under Murray, however, courts once again have the opportunity to
"mask" the. considerations that underlie their decisions. 3 This is so
because the court evidently must no longer articulate the policy consid-
erations and particular factual findings that underlie its conclusion re-
garding scope of the duty. Furthermore, Murray in effect shifts the-
responsibility for limiting negligence liability from the trial court back.
onto the jury, at least in those cases in which the trial court finds that
the defendant did owe a duty. Under a comparative fault system like
Louisiana's, once the trial court finds a duty, the jury then must
apportion fault between the defendant and the victim. Thus, the limi-.
tation of negligence liability is performed by the jury under the aegis
of comparative fault. For these reasons, Murray represents a shift in
analysis -away from duty/risk towards an approach that is the effective
equivalent of proximate cause.
SCOPE OF DUTY AND VICTIM FAULT: TWO DISTINCT VIEWS
Louisiana's adoption of comparative fault in 198014 raised the ques-
tion of how the courts would integrate that system with the preexisting
duty/risk analysis. This section will examine the two prominent theories
concerning the proper relationship between the scope of duty and victim
51. 242 La. 471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962). As Wex Malone once stated, "I beg the
reader's indulgence if, for the sake of brevity (and without regional or political impli-
cations), I refer to the decision hereafter simply as Dixie." Malone, supra note 17, at
364.
52. McNamara, supra note 19, at 1249. See Rue v. State, 372 So. 2d 1197 (La.
1979); Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978); Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 400 (La. 1978); Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d
406 (La. 1976); Jones v. Robbins, 289 So. 2d 104 (La. 1974).
53. The case is totally devoid of any policy, social, or economic considerations.
54. See supra note 8.
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fault under duty/risk analysis. These two theories are the "Johnson
view," reflected in the writings of Professors Alston Johnson;55 Wex
Malone,56 and Leon Green5 7 and the "Robertson view," reflected in
the writings of Professor David Robertson.5" These commentators differ
on both the relevance of victim fault to the delineation of duty and
who should determine victim fault's ultimate effect on liability. An
examination of these opposing theories illuminates the significance of
the supreme court's treatment of victim fault in Murray.
The Johnson view calls for the court to consider victim fault in
defining the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. Professor
Johnson postulates three categories of cases: (a) those in which the
defendant's duty extends to the protection of a plaintiff against his own
carelessness;5 9 (b) those in which the plaintiff's substandard conduct
creates a situation that falls outside the scope of the defendant's duty; 60
and (c) those in which both the fault of the plaintiff and the fault of
the defendant are considered and compared. 6' Under this approach, in
some circumstances a negligent plaintiff would recover full damages, in
others he would recover nothing, and in still others his recovery would
be reduced. Professor Johnson bases this view on a general policy of
avoiding the decision of legal issues, such as the scope of a defendant's
duty, by jurors. 62 He argues that the duty/risk analysis requires judges
to decide the defendant's responsibilities, rather than justifying jurors'
conclusions with "the shibboleths of 'proximate cause' and 'last clear
chance' and others of the same ilk." 63
Professor Robertson takes the position that victim fault should be
irrelevant to the determination of the defendant's duty.64 He argues that
the use of definitions of duty to justify either total recovery or no
recovery by a negligent plaintiff is itself similar to "last clear chance":
55. Johnson, supra note 8, at 327 n.32.
56. Malone, supra note 17.
57. L. Green, Judge and Jury 60 (1930). The Johnson view owes a tremendous
amount to the theories and writings of Leon Green and Wex Malone, but for that matter
so does all of tort law.
58. David Robertson is the Albert Sidney Burleson Professor of law at the University
of Texas.
59.1 Johnson, supra note 8, at 333.
60. Id. at 334.
61. Id. at 339. Because these three categories have come to be known as (a), (b),
and (c) cases, respectively, these designations will be preserved for the purposes of this
article.
62. Id. at 340.
63. Id. at 341.
64. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative
Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana,
44 La. L. Rev. 1341, 1341-42, 1357 (1984).
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it is a method developed by courts to evade the perceived injustices of
contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. As such, it also
should be eliminated with the advent of comparative fault. 65 Robertson
advocates performing a duty/risk analysis in victim fault cases by hy-
pothesizing a fault-free victim.6 He argues that the cases used by Johnson
to justify the consideration of victim fault in determining duty can be
resolved doctrinally by a proper analysis of the other necessary elements
of the plaintiff's case, such as cause in fact or breach of duty.67
Thus, the ultimate difference between the two approaches is the
extent to which each considers the facts of the individual case in de-
termining the scope of the duty. The Johnson .view is consistent with
the development of the duty/risk analysis. Duty/risk requires the judge
to undertake a particularized analysis of the facts to resolve the difficult,
policy-laden issue of the scope of the defendant's duty. Ideally, when
judges set the bounds of liability, they articulate their reasoning. This
enables everyone to see the basis of the court's decision. The role of
the jury is to decide purely factual questions, such as whether there was
a breach of the duty. Because the effect of victim fault is a question
of law, it remains in the hands of the judge. 61
The Johnson view, however, does present some practical problems.
Robertson argues that it increases the potential for confusion, 69 multiplies
litigation points, 70 and obfuscates the necessary inquiry into the facts
that matter,7 ' particularly in multi-party litigation. His most serious
criticism, however, is that the use of this analysis transfers the burden
of proof on the issue of victim fault to the plaintiff. Instead of the
defendant being required to prove comparative negligence as a defense,
the plaintiff must disprove victim fault to a certain degree in order to
establish a necessary element of his case-in-chief, the defendant's duty. 72
In contrast, the Robertson view is at least partially based on an
explicit preference for resolutions by juries over judges, and by trial
judges over appellate judges." Calling for a more generalized analysis
of duty, Robertson states, "Virtually all of the considerations Johnson
would relegate to judges as part of the duty-risk question of law are
properly left to triers of fact as part of their assessment of the degree
65. Id. at 1360-62.
66. Id. at 1378.
67. Id. at 1369-70.
68. Johnson, supra note 8, at 340-41.
69. Robertson, supra note 64, at 1370.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1374-82.
73. Id. at 1359.
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of fault of the parties. '7 4 Under the Robertson formulation, victim fault
is a factual question for the jury.
The primary problem of the Robertson approach is that its narrow
definition of the legal issue of duty combined with its broad definition
of facts to be decided by the jury defeats the primary purpose of the
duty/risk analysis. Since the court does not address the pertinent facts
of the victim's conduct in its determination of duty, it is bound, absent
clear factual error, by the jury's determination of liability. This will
require judges to rationalize results, rather than control them. By leaving
so much in the hands of the fact-finder, the Robertson view invites a
return to something resembling a proximate cause analysis. 75
These two approaches reflect something more than simply the ques-
tion of whether victim fault is relevant to the scope of the defendant's
duty. Under the Johnson view, the court considers the specific facts of
the case at hand in determining the ultimate duty of the defendant to
the plaintiff. This continues the jury-controlling function of the duty/
risk analysis. In contrast, the Robertson view calls for the court to
generalize the facts and make broader decisions on duty. This decrease
in the judge's control over the particular case is matched by an increase
in the power of the jury. Thus the resolution of the victim fault issue
has broad implications for the future development of the duty/risk
analysis generally.
VICTIM FAULT AND MURRAY
In Murray, the court eliminated the consideration of the plaintiff's
conduct, or victim fault, from the duty/risk analysis. As the court
explained,
in any case where the defendant would otherwise be liable to
the plaintiff under a negligence or strict liability theory, the fact
that the plaintiff may have been aware of the risk created by
defendant's conduct should not operate as a total bar to re-
covery. Instead, comparative fault principles should apply, and
the victim's "awareness of the danger" is among the factors to
be considered in assessing percentages of fault. 76
As this language reveals, the Murray court's treatment of victim fault
removes consideration of victim fault from the determination of the
bounds of duty. In so doing, the court's approach eliminates any need
74. Id. at 1342.
75. Of course, appellate review of facts in Louisiana "means the distinction between
judge issues and jury issues is hard to keep straight and often does not particularly need
to be kept straight." Id. at 1357 n'88.
76. Murray, 521 So. 2d at 1134.
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for Professor Johnson's type (a) and type (b) cases. Under Murray,
there is no room for a finding that the plaintiff's own negligent conduct
fell within or outside the scope of defendant's duty. Upon the trial
court's finding a legal relationship between the classes represented by
the parties, the case must go to the jury for an assessment of each
party's proportion of the fault. Therefore, under Murray juries will
decide virtually all scope of duty questions. 7
7
The Murray decision is troubling in several other respects as well.
For one thing, the decision may reflect a sentiment on the part of the
court that because of recent developments in Louisiana's tort law, par-
ticularly the institution of a scheme of comparative fault, duty/risk
analysis is no longer of critical importance. The primary purpose of the
development of duty/risk analysis, the court seems to imply, was to
avoid the harshness of contributory negligence. In a pre-comparative
system, courts could use duty/risk analysis to find that the risk posed
to the plaintiff by his own contributory negligence was within the scope
of the defendant's duty, thereby allowing the plaintiff to obtain recovery.
Murray seems to suggest that because contributory negligence has been
eliminated, duty/risk should no longer play such a major role in the
apportionment of fault. Defining duty broadly and transferring respon-
sibility for fault apportionment to the jury implements this tacit judg-
ment.
Perhaps more troubling is the fact that the Murray approach does
not require the trial court to focus on the individual characteristics of
the particular plaintiff, or to differentiate classes of plaintiffs that should,
from the standpoint of sound policy, be treated differently. What if
the plaintiff is a trespasser or a thief?7" Is any plaintiff entitled to go
to the jury simply because the defendant breached its duty of "reason-
ableness" to that class of plaintiffs? Do defendants owe a duty to the
world? The Murray approach provides no guidance regarding how, or
even whether, distinctions between types or classes of plaintiffs should
be drawn.
Finally, the Murray approach is troubling in that it strips scope of
duty determinations of predictive value for judges and lawyers. Ironically,
in a jurisdiction that champions duty/risk, 9 our highest court in Murray
shields its reasoning from public and professional scrutiny.
The determination of scope of duty can be likened to a mathematical
examination. When taking a mathematical examination, if one does not
77. If the jury decides that plaintiff's conduct places him outside the accountability
of the defendant, it will affix the plaintiff's recovery at 0%.
78. See, e.g., Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983).
79. As stated by E. Wayne Thode in 1977, "only the Supreme Court of Louisiana
has fully embraced this method of analysis. It is now building a body of duty-risk case
law." Thode, supra note 9, at 23.
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show the reasoning employed to obtain the answer, one fails. In de-
termining scope of duty the same holds true. The court in Murray does
not show its reasoning, therefore it fails. If the result reached is incorrect,
the effects are extremely detrimental, in that, since no discourse is shown
it is not evident where exactly the mistake was made. As a result, the
process must begin anew. If the result reached is correct, the effect is
also harmful, in that one can ever be sure that the correct reasoning
was employed. Either way, the omission of the means results in a failure
of the end. For lawyers and judges this failure eliminates a case's
predictive value except in the broadest of terms.
THE EXPANSION OF DUTY: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
As Professor Steiner has said, "[t]he tendency in recent decades is
for courts to understand and refer to the parties to an accident less in
personal or individualized ways and more in general, abstract, and
categorical terms." 0 A natural result of this type of classification is a
broadening of the scope of duty.81 The Murray court, by placing the
plaintiff within a class of "users" and the defendant within a class of
pool owners, followed the trend of defining litigants in a more general
and categorical manner. Accordingly, the court did not address the
specific characteristics of the parties or the particular policies implicated
in the case. Whether and to what extent the supreme court will continue
to follow the trends reflected in Murray is, of course, an open question.
Two recent decisions handed down by the supreme court, both of which
involved difficult scope of duty problems, may provide an answer.
In the first of these cases, Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital,82
the parents of an albino child filed suit for themselves and on behalf
of their child for damages caused by the alleged negligence of a doctor
who failed to sterilize the mother properly. 3 The court, which addressed
each claim separately, applied duty/risk analysis to the child's action,84
and the doctrine of proximate or "legal" cause to the parent's action. 5
80. Steiner, supra note 1, at 106.
81. Id.
82. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
83. Id. at 1153.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1156. In so doing the court states,
"[w]e conclude that, when the case presents difficult issues as to the nature
and extent of damages ascribed to the defendant, once it has been decided that
the defendant's breach of a duty in fact caused damage to the plaintiff, it may
be helpful to use a 'legal cause' analysis which affords the application of
'foreseeability' rules and other concepts of limitation. Although indistinct, these
rules and concepts are more determinate that the abstract idea of 'duty' based
on various 'policy considerations' and may prove helpful to triers of fact, at
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The child's claim was for damages for "wrongful life." Although
the court did apply duty/risk analysis to the claim, it is not entirely
clear which variety of that analysis-the pre-Murray approach or the
post-Murray approach-the court actually employed. In some respects,
the analysis was clearly traditional. Commenting on the specific birth
defect upon which the child's claim was based, albinism, the court stated
that "[tjhe plaintiff's petition did not contain any allegation that the
defendant physician knew or should have known of the risk of the
abnormality. 8 6 For this reason, the court concluded that "in the present
case the physician did not owe a duty to the unconceived child to protect
her from the risk of being born with albinism. ' '8 7 Thus, the court did
limit the defendant's duty and apparently did so on the basis of a
"particularized" inquiry. This appearance, however, may be deceiving.
In many respects the court's analysis bore the earmarks of the Murray
approach. Explaining its decision to apply duty/risk analysis to the
claim, the court stated that "duty risk is most helpful . . in cases
where the only issue is in reality whether the defendant stands in any
relationship to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized obligation
of conduct for the plaintiff's benefit." 88 The court's point, apparently,
is that courts should use duty/risk analysis only to determine if the
relationship between the parties is substantial enough to warrant imposing
a duty upon the defendant. Further, the court's remarks strongly suggest
that the relevant relationship is not that obtaining between the particular
plaintiff and the particular defendant, but rather is that obtaining be-
tween the classes to which the plaintiff and the defendant belong. As
the court stated, "[tihe time has come when we can and should say
that each person owes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which he can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure a
present or future member of society .... "89 Thus, the court's position
apparently was that all doctors who perform sterilizations owe some
general duty of reasonable care to all unborn children of their female
patients, or at least those who suffer from foreseen physical defects.
To the extent that the court delimited the defendant's duty by reference
to the relationship between the plaintiff's class and the defendant's class,
its analysis was consistent with the approach developed in Murray.
least as starting points for legal reasoning."
From this text, it is apparent that the court is stating that legal cause, which is the same
as proximate cause, will apply when duty/risk is not applicable. Note that the choice
between duty/risk and proximate cause is left to the will of the court with no indication
of when each method will be employed.
86. Id. at 1158.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1155 (emphasis added). It should be noted that duty/risk is not referred
to as an analysis for limiting liability, only as a method for determining relationship.
89. Id. at 1157.
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The influence of the trends set in motion by Murray is even more
evident in the Pitre court's treatment of the parent's claim. In evaluating
that claim the court did not apply duty/risk analysis but instead invoked
the doctrine of "legal" cause, a concept that is distinctly reminiscent
of "proximate" cause. According to the court, the primary test for
determining whether a cause is a "legal" cause of the plaintiff's injuries
is foreseeability. As the court stated, "as a general principle . . . the
same criterion of foreseeability and risk of harm which determined
whether a physician in this kind of situation was negligent-in the first
instance should determine the extent of his liability for that negli-
gence. ... "9 The Pitre court has therefore converted both the breach
of duty question and the scope of duty question into indistinguishable
questions of fact. As has been noted, this kind of development enhances
the role of the jury and diminishes the responsibility of the court.
Furthermore, by reintroducing the vague phrases of "foreseeability" and
"direct consequence" into the law governing the limitation of duty, the
Pitre court has moved farther along in the journey to the reestablishment
of proximate cause that was began in Murray.
To summarize, Pitre defines and applies duty/risk on a broader
basis than classically employed, thus reinforcing the court's rationale in
Murray. There is a certain antinomy in the Pitre decision. On the one
hand, the court reaffirmed the principle that "[i]t is the task of bench
and the bar not only to ensure that justice is done, but also to dem-
onstrate that it is being done according to law, which is essential to
preserving public confidence." 9' The court therefore acknowledged the
importance of judges' exposing to public scrutiny the policy consider-
ations that underlie their scope of duty determinations, an exposition
that is fostered, and indeed required, by traditional duty/risk analysis.
On the other hand, the court bluntly asserted that the idea of that
"duty" is based on various "policy considerations" in the abstract and
not helpful to triers of fact. 92 This statement, coupled with the court's
remarks about legal cause, suggests a basic hostility to the core principles
of duty/risk analysis and seems to signal a return to allocating risk
under the guise of proximate cause, an approach that inevitably leads
to the shielding of judicial policy-making from public view. Because the
Pitre decision gives off such conflicting signals, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine what implications the decision has for the future
of the duty/risk innovations announced in Murray.
The future of the new trends in risk allocation signaled by Murray
is clouded even further by the recent case of Gresham v. Davenport,93
90. Id. at 1161.
91. Id. at 1156.
92. Id.
93. 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989).
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a case in which the supreme court evidently applied the traditional,
particularized duty/risk approach. A fifteen year old girl served several
beers to James Ford, a sixteen year old boy, while the two of them
were at her father's residence. Ford eventually became intoxicated. Later,
while Ford was riding as a passenger in a car, he grabbed the steering
wheel, and caused the car to run off the roadway into a tree. As a
result of the accident, the driver was killed and two passengers other
than Ford were injured. 94 The issue before the court was whether the
fifteen year old owed a duty to the passengers to protect them from
the risks that caused their injuries. In holding for the defendants the
court stated, "Even assuming that Molly had a duty not to provide
Ford with beer and that she breached that duty, we would nevertheless
have to determine whether the particular risk falls within the scope of
the duty." g According to the court, "the particular risk was not within
the scope of whatever duty that Molly, a minor herself, might have
owed to Ford. '96 Thus, the court apparently applied the classic, par-
ticularized, case by case duty/risk approach. Unfortunately, the court's
only explanation for its ruling on the scope of the defendant's duty was
that "[n]either teenager was a novice to beer drinking. '97 The court
failed to indicate, from the standpoint of sound policy, why the actors'
familiarity with beer should have barred recovery by third parties. There-
fore, although the court's application of duty/risk was case-focused, the
decision has little precedential value.
After Pitre and Gresham, the future of the trends in duty/risk
analysis reflected in Murray remains unclear. Are courts to take a class-
based, relational approach to duty/risk in those cases that involve victim
fault and thereby once again, as they did in the heyday of proximate
cause, abdicate their responsibility for risk allocation to jurors? In non-
victim fault cases, are courts free to choose between duty/risk and legal
cause? How and why should they make this choice? If the case involves
a superceding cause, is a traditional, particularized duty/risk approach
mandatory? Unfortunately, there are no clear answers to this question.
One thing is certain, however: whatever predictability accident law once
had in Louisiana has vanished.
CONCLUSION
Under a system in which liability is limited through the doctrine of
proximate cause, the jury assesses liability based upon whether a party's
injury is foreseeable or direct or a natural or probable consequence of
94. Id. at 1145.
95. Id. at 1147.
96. Id. at 1148.
97. Id. at 1147.
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the defendant's action. The central problem with such an approach to
risk allocation is that it does not give the law a sufficient degree of
predictability and objectivity. It also allows the judge to defer to the
jury on important policy matters.
Duty/risk analysis, championed by Wex Malone, offers a better
means of risk allocation. The traditional variety of this analysis, which
requires the court to take into account the conduct of each individual
party and the peculiar circumstances of the case, leaves little room for
subjective determinations of the extent of liability. Under this approach,
the court is bound to determine the scope of the particular defendant's
duty, a determination that is a purely "legal" matter; the jury is con-
fronted only with factual determinations, such as what really took place
and whether the defendant's conduct breached its duty to the plaintiff.
One critically important feature of this approach is that it requires the
judge to articulate the policy rationale underlying his decision regarding
the scope of the defendant's duty, thereby providing predictability for
future litigants.
Several recent decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, beginning
with Murray, raise serious questions about the future of traditional
duty/risk analysis in Louisiana. In that case the court, instead of looking
to the particular litigants and the particular relationship between them
in order to define the scope of the defendant's duty, focused upon the
relationship between the general classes represented by each of the lit-
igants. Following Murray, the trial court will no longer be required to
set limits on liability before submitting a case to the jury; instead, it
will be able to state the duty in broad terms and then allow the jury
to set the actual limit of liability, thereby placing the determination of
the scope of the duty within the jury's discretion.
The transformation in duty/risk analysis begun in Murray clearly
entails a number of difficulties. Perhaps the most distressing is that the
change will allow both trial and appellate courts to uphold findings of
liability without clearly stating their reasoning. Not only would this
development shield judicial decisions from scholarly critique; it would
also strip accident law of its predictability. In short, the Murray decision
may ultimately result in reinstituting in Louisiana tort law the mysticism
that plagued proximate cause.
James Michael Chamblee
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